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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have long recognized that many or even most agency
legal interpretations are made informally rather than by regulations promul-
gated through notice-and-comment rulemaking and published in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Agencies adopt interpretations of law informally us-
ing a range of formats from official pronouncements vetted by top agency
officials to letters and e-mails issued by relatively low-level agency em-
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Shaffer, and symposium participants for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Lindsey
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ployees.1 The relative weight and significance of such informal guidance
varies tremendously, although prudent regulated parties take seriously agen-
cy guidance in virtually any form.2
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) stands as no exception
to this phenomenon. Although Treasury regulations are the most formal
and authoritative expression of Treasury Department (Treasury) and IRS
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.),3 the IRS's national
office publishes a series of official and authoritative, if informal, guidance
documents in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (IRB) each week and the Cumu-
lative Bulletin (CB) annually.' By far the most common and prominent of
these documents are revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices,
which are often referred to collectively as "IRB guidance," or sometimes
"other published guidance."'
1. See generally, e.g., Robert Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?,
41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332-55 (1992) (documenting broad agency utilization of informal for-
mats); Donald L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Re-
troactivity in the 21st Century: A View From Within, 46 DuQ. L. REV. 323, 330-72 (2008)
(discussing legal authority, reliability, and retroactive effect of twenty-five different informal
IRS formats ranging from published rulings to oral communications).
2. Scholars sometimes speak of informal guidance as carrying practical if not legal
binding effect and debate over the extent to which that should matter. See, e.g., I CHARLES
H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.60 (2d ed. 1997) (acknowledging
practical binding effect of interpretative rules, guidelines, and policy statements, but suggest-
ing that "[o]n the other hand, agencies should be encouraged to ... give as much guidance as
possible to the regulated"); Anthony, supra note 1, at 1327-32 (discussing problems of non-
legislative rules with practical binding effect); Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and
the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 1497 (1992) (attempting to balance practical
binding effect and agency willingness to consider alternative views).
3. See, e.g., Korb, supra note 1, at 326 ("[Treasury] regulations constitute the pri-
mary source for guidance as to the Service's position regarding the interpretation of the
[I.R.C.]").
4. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(1) (as amended in 1987) (describing the IRB as
"the authoritative instrument of the Commissioner for the announcement of official rulings,
decisions, opinions, and procedures" and the policy of the IRS as being "to publish in the
Bulletin all substantive and procedural rulings of importance or general interest" including
revenue procedures "which are of general applicability and which have continuing force and
effect" and "statements of internal practices and procedures affecting rights or duties of
taxpayers"); Rev. Proc. 89-14 § 4.01, 1989-1 C.B. 814 (recognizing the IRB as "authorita-
tive"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §
32.2.2.1(1) (2004) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL] (noting that "[r]evenue rulings,
revenue procedures, [and] notices ... are issued only by the national office and are published
in the IRB").
5. Revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices are not the only informal
guidance formats the IRS publishes in the CB and IRB. The IRS also routinely publishes
documents labeled "announcements," which the IRS defines as "a public pronouncement that
has only immediate or short-term value." See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, §
32.2.2.3.4. The IRS claims that announcements lack substantive interpretations of the I.R.C.
See id. This assertion appears accurate, as most announcements merely highlight and reite-
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IRB guidance is not the only informal guidance that the IRS makes
available to taxpayers.' Thanks in part to a string of lawsuits seeking access
to myriad unpublished IRS letter rulings, internal memoranda, and other
documents containing IRS legal interpretations and analysis, reams of such
material are publicly available through Westlaw, Lexis, and other sources.'
Nevertheless, unlike other unpublished IRS materials, the IRS designates
IRB guidance as "official" and, in litigation, claims a heightened level of
judicial deference for the interpretations advanced therein. Accordingly,
IRB guidance is particularly relevant to taxpayers, and thus especially wor-
thy of closer academic inquiry.
Having studied in some depth the complex of administrative law is-
sues surrounding the government's utilization of Treasury regulations as a
mechanism for interpreting the I.R.C., I have heretofore assumed IRB guid-
ance to be a more straightforward proposition. Tax scholars and practition-
ers recognize a certain, widely-accepted narrative regarding the role and
legal significance of IRB guidance. In contemplating my contribution to
this Symposium, therefore, I originally conceived a short essay reviewing
this narrative and suggesting IRB guidance as a comparatively simple me-
chanism by which the IRS could provide guidance to taxpayers while avoid-
ing the messy legal and jurisprudential problems of Treasury regulations.
In examining IRB guidance more closely, however, I have found in-
stead that these documents raise an even more profound set of doctrinal
rate information that taxpayers could find elsewhere. See, e.g., I.R.S. Announcement 2009-
10, 2009-9 I.R.B. 644 (Mar. 2, 2009) (identifying several entities whose public charity status
the IRS recently revoked); I.R.S. Announcement 2009-8, 2009-8 I.R.B. 598 (Feb. 23, 2009)
(announcing disciplinary actions taken against named tax professionals); I.R.S. Announce-
ment 2008-128, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1376 (Dec. 29, 2008) (noting minor corrections to temporary
regulations also published in the Federal Register). Consequently, at least for now, an-
nouncements are distinguishable from other IRB guidance formats, do not raise the same
issues, and thus fall outside the scope of this Essay.
6. See, e.g., Korb, supra note 1, at 342-73 (describing a few dozen different types
of other IRS documents that potentially contain insights into IRS thinking regarding the
I.R.C.); see also David L. Click & Jennifer B. Green, New IRS Legal Advice Vehicles: New
and Improved or Needs Improvement?, 761 PLI/TAx 721, 726 (2007) (listing and discussing
some of these other interpretive formats similarly).
7. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits against the IRS seeking disclosure of
internal agency documents are quite common; in particular, Tax Analysts, an organization
that publishes daily and weekly periodicals documenting tax legislative, judicial, and regula-
tory news, has sued the government several times under FOIA to obtain access to various
IRS rulings, agreements, and memoranda. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 495 F.3d 676, 677
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Tax Analysts v. IRS,
117 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); see also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1660-67 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6110 (2000)) (requiring public disclosure of
"any written determination" including rulings, determination letters, and technical advice
memoranda).
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questions than Treasury regulations. A full exploration of these doctrinal
problems is beyond the scope of this Symposium and this Essay. My pur-
pose here, therefore, is to introduce this much larger project in two ways:
first, by identifying inconsistencies between the accepted wisdom and con-
temporary reality of IRB guidance; and second, by observing that IRB guid-
ance falls directly into a large doctrinal void of what it means for a rule to
carry the force of law and the extent to which that concept defines the inter-
section between Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking proce-
dures' and the judicial deference doctrine.'
Accordingly, I begin in Part I by describing the three primary IRB
guidance formats and documenting how the IRS defines and utilizes them.
In Part II, I summarize generally accepted understandings in administrative
law doctrine as it relates to informal agency guidance, including the uncer-
tainty concerning the force of law question. Finally, in Part III, I recognize
the accepted wisdom of courts and scholars regarding how IRB guidance
fits within those general administrative law understandings, and also how
changes in the reality of IRB guidance arguably push that guidance squarely
into the force of law no man's land.
I. WHAT IS IRB GUIDANCE?
As noted, three primary formats comprise the bulk of contemporary
IRB guidance: revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices. The tax
community, including the IRS, views these formats as distinct from one
another; in theory, each of these formats possesses characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from the others. As colloquially understood, revenue rulings
express the IRS's interpretation of existing law as applied to facts;'o revenue
procedures are, well, procedural;" and notices are informal statements of
IRS policy regarding enforcement and other issues.12 Official definitions
8. See infra Part II.A (describing APA rulemaking procedures).
9. See infra Part II.B (describing the deference doctrine and standards of judicial
review).
10. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling
Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1044-45 (1995); Korb, supra note 1, at 330;
Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., Judicial Deference for Revenue Rulings in a Post-
Mead World, 6 J. TAx PRAC. & PROC. 27, 28 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Terence Floyd Cuff, Community Property Partnerships and Like-Kind
Exchanges, 814 PLI/TAx 723, 732 (2008); Theodore M. David, Trammels of the Tax Tangle:
What Every Lawyer Should Know About the IRS, BENCH & B. OF MINN., Mar. 2005, at 21;
Korb, supra note 1, at 337.
12. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671
(2008) (describing IRS notices as "press releases stating the IRS's position on a particular
issue and informing the public of its intentions"); see also Korb, supra note 1, at 339-42
(stating alternatively that the IRS "resorts to notices . . . when there is need for guidance on
an expedited basis").
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contained in various Treasury regulations and IRS pronouncements are a
little broader.
Perhaps not surprisingly, actual practice is somewhat different from
both the common perception and the official definitions. Changes in usage
over time have blurred the distinctions, so that there is now significant over-
lap among the IRB guidance formats and tremendous variation within each
format. Consequently, when evaluating IRB guidance in relation to admin-
istrative law doctrine, it is arguably more appropriate to consider what each
individual document does, rather than evaluate the formats categorically.
A. Revenue Rulings
Of the three principal IRB guidance formats, the IRS has promulgated
and published revenue rulings the longest-since 1953." The IRS adopted
the revenue ruling format to address in a more generalized form questions
that were identified and otherwise addressed through unpublished private
letter rulings issued to individual taxpayers and through litigation.14 The
IRS formally defines a revenue ruling as "an official interpretation by the
Service of the internal revenue laws and related statutes, treaties, and regu-
lations, that has been published in the [IRB] . . . for the information and
guidance of taxpayers, Service officials, and others concerned."" More
practically, the IRS elaborates that a revenue ruling "is the conclusion of the
13. The IRS published the first revenue ruling in 1953. See Rev. Rul. 1, 1953-1
C.B. 36 (1953); see also Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484 (summarizing key aspects of the new
revenue ruling program). The IRS changed its system for numbering revenue rulings in 1954
by adding the last two digits in the year to the otherwise consecutively-numbered revenue
rulings. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-1, 1954-1 C.B. 29. The IRS altered the numbering for reve-
nue rulings again in 2000 to include the entire year. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2000-1, 2000-1 C.B.
250.
14. See Korb, supra note 1, at 333-34 (documenting the history of revenue rulings);
Mitchell Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity: A View
from Within, 43 TAXES 756, 763-67 (1965) (same).
15. Rev. Proc. 89-14 § 3.01, 1989-1 C.B. 814. Although Rev. Proc. 89-14 is merely
the latest among a string of revenue procedures to define revenue rulings, the official defini-
tion has not changed materially since the IRS introduced the program in 1953. See Rev.
Proc. 86-15, 1986-1 C.B. 544 (superseding Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503, and super-
seded by Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814); Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503 (supersed-
ing Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693); Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693 (superseding Rev.
Proc. 68-44, 1968-2 C.B. 954); Rev. Proc. 68-44, 1968-2 C.B. 954 (superseding Rev. Rul. 2,
1953-1 C.B. 484). Treasury regulations contain a similar but more abbreviated definition
that recognizes the official status and interpretive function of revenue rulings without speci-
fying exactly what they interpret. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as amended in
1987) (defining revenue ruling as "an official interpretation by the Service that has been
published in the [IRB]"); Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (as amended in 2002) (same).
Spring] 243
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Service on how the law is applied to a specific set of facts."'" In other
words, the function of the revenue ruling format is to communicate substan-
tive interpretations of the tax laws." Treasury and the IRS explicitly limit
the official applicability of revenue rulings to the facts articulated therein."
Because the IRS views revenue rulings as interpretations of existing, more
authoritative legal sources, it generally applies these rulings retroactively,
except where a revenue ruling revokes or modifies another published rul-
ing.19
Consistent with the ruling program's original purpose as well as these
official definitions, most early revenue rulings apply existing sources of law
to various factual scenarios. Many of these early rulings follow a simple
format of (1) offering one or more hypothetical fact patterns; (2) identifying
a particular legal issue raised thereby; (3) analyzing the relevant I.R.C. pro-
visions, Treasury regulations, and judicial opinions that inform the issue;
and (4) reaching a holding or conclusion as to the proper tax treatment of
the facts as outlined.20 Other early revenue rulings achieve similar results
by acknowledging a particular source of ambiguity in the I.R.C., articulating
various guiding principles that the IRS considers relevant in deciphering the
ambiguous language, and providing examples of fact patterns demonstrating
the application of those principles.2' Still other early revenue rulings sum-
marize facts, legal analysis, and conclusions of court cases for the purpose
of announcing that the IRS will or will not acquiesce in their holdings.22
Many contemporary revenue rulings resemble their early predecessors,
analyzing and interpreting the tax laws to address particular fact patterns or
announcing reactions to court cases.23 Yet, quite a few rulings deviate from
16. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 32.2.2.3.1; see also supra note 10
and accompanying text (describing corresponding common conceptions of revenue rulings).
17. See Rev. Proc. 89-14 § 7.01(1), 1989-1 C.B. 814, 815 ("Rulings and other com-
munications involving substantive tax law published in the Bulletin are published in the form
of revenue rulings.").
18. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a) (as amended in 1987) ("The conclusions ex-
pressed in a revenue ruling will be directly responsive to, and limited in scope by, the pivotal
facts stated in the revenue ruling."); Rev. Proc. 89-14 § 7.01(1), 1989-1 C.B. 814, 815
(same).
19. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(c) (as amended in 1987) (declaring that most
revenue rulings apply retroactively unless otherwise specified); Rev. Proc. 89-14 § 7.01(3),
1989-1 C.B. 814, 815 (same); see also I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2000) ("The Secretary may pre-
scribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling .. . relating to the internal revenue laws shall be
applied without retroactive effect.").
20. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 14, 1953-1 C.B. 348; Rev. Rul. 9, 1953-1 C.B. 468; Rev.
Rul. 7, 1953-1 C.B. 224; Rev. Rul. 6, 1953-1 C.B. 120; Rev. Rul. 3, 1953-1 C.B. 37.
21. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 12, 1953-1 C.B. 290; Rev. Rul. 8, 1953-1 C.B. 300.
22. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 4, 1953-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 20, 1953-1 C.B. 426.
23. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2009-4, 2009-5 I.R.B. 408; Rev. Rul. 2008-42, 2008-30
I.R.B. 175; Rev. Rul. 2008-39, 2008-31 I.R.B. 252; Rev. Rul. 2008-30, 2008-25 I.R.B. 1156;
Rev. Rul. 2008-23, 2008-18 I.R.B. 852.
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the prototype.24 For example, the IRS each month uses the revenue ruling
format to publish applicable federal interest rates and adjustable percentages
for various purposes in the I.R.C.25 Another regularly-issued series of reve-
nue rulings provides quarterly interest rate tables applicable to tax over-
payments and underpayments pursuant to I.R.C. § 6621.26 In fact, almost
half of the revenue rulings issued in 2008 differed in this way from the more
traditional revenue ruling format-providing monthly, quarterly, biannual,
or annual rate tables for one purpose or another rather than substantive ap-
plications of the law to various circumstances. 27 The IRS frequently uses
the revenue procedure format to provide similar information,28 which leads
one to wonder why the IRS chooses one format versus the other for such
purposes.
24. Revenue rulings deviating from the original, fact-based format are not entirely a
contemporary phenomenon. Before the IRS started publishing revenue procedures, it occa-
sionally used revenue rulings to convey procedural rules. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 18, 1953-1
C.B. 15 (tables for calculating individual income tax liabilities); Rev. Rul. 22, 1953-1 C.B.
84 (instructions for filing return deadline extension requests); Rev. Rul. 5, 1953-1 C.B. 87
(guidelines for reproducing tax forms and schedules). Such use of the revenue ruling format
seems to have declined precipitously with the introduction of the revenue procedure format
in 1955. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing history of revenue proce-
dures).
25. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-53, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1231; Rev. Rul. 2008-50, 2008-45
I.R.B. 1098; Rev. Rul. 2008-49, 2008-40 I.R.B. 811; Rev. Rul. 2008-46, 2008-36 I.R.B. 572;
Rev. Rul. 2008-43, 2008-31 I.R.B. 258; Rev. Rul. 2008-33, 2008-27 I.R.B. 8; Rev. Rul.
2008-28, 2008-22 I.R.B. 1029; Rev. Rul. 2008-24, 2008-18 I.R.B. 861; Rev. Rul. 2008-20,
2008-14 I.R.B. 716; Rev. Rul. 2008-11, 2008-10 I.R.B. 541; Rev. Rul. 2008-9, 2008-5 I.R.B.
343; Rev. Rul. 2008-4, 2008-3 I.R.B. 272; see also BoRis 1. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 46.05[7] (3d ed. 2002) (describing the contents of these
monthly rulings).
26. See Rev. Rul. 2008-54, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1352; Rev. Rul. 2008-47, 2008-39 I.R.B.
760; Rev. Rul. 2008-27, 2008-26 I.R.B. 1181; Rev. Rul. 2008-10, 2008-13 I.R.B. 676.
27. In 2008, in addition to the sixteen revenue rulings described in the two preceding
footnotes, the IRS issued two revenue rulings with annual inflation adjustments for debt
instruments under I.R.C. § 1274A (2000). See Rev. Rul. 2008-52, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1233; Rev.
Rul. 2008-3, 2008-2 I.R.B. 249. The IRS also issued two revenue rulings with biannual rates
for calculating the value of non-commercial airline flights provided as flinge benefits. See
Rev. Rul. 2008-48, 2008-38 I.R.B. 713; Rev. Rul. 2008-14, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578. The IRS
further produced three revenue rulings with monthly bond factor amounts related to disposi-
tions of qualified low-income buildings for various periods. See Rev. Rul. 2008-36, 2008-30
I.R.B. 165; Rev. Rul. 2008-21, 2008-15 I.R.B. 734; Rev. Rul. 2008-2, 2008-2 I.R.B. 247.
Finally, the IRS released three other revenue rulings with assorted annual interest rate tables.
See Rev. Rul. 2008-51, 2008-47 I.R.B. 1171; Rev. Rul. 2008-44, 2008-32 I.R.B. 292; Rev.
Rul. 2008-19, 2008-13 I.R.B. 669. Collectively these represent 26 of the 54 revenue rulings
issued in 2008, or 48% of the total.
28. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-71, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1251; Rev. Proc. 2008-70, 2008-
49 I.R.B. 1240; Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107; Rev. Proc. 2008-22, 2008-12
I.R.B. 658.
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Finally, although both the IRS and the tax community at large tend to
regard revenue rulings as a format for providing substantive interpretive
guidance, the IRS occasionally disclaims any such intent in individual reve-
nue rulings. Consider, for example, Revenue Ruling 2008-17.29 Sections
872 and 883 of the I.R.C. exempt from U.S. taxation certain income of non-
resident alien individuals and foreign corporations from countries that grant
"equivalent exemption[s]" to U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations.30 In
Revenue Ruling 2008-17, the IRS updated lists provided in earlier revenue
rulings of countries that "may provide various forms of equivalent exemp-
tions" for these purposes." Nevertheless, the IRS explicitly stated in Reve-
nue Ruling 2008-17 that the ruling was not intended to provide "substantive
guidance."32 This statement is difficult to reconcile with the IRS's choice of
a format intended to provide official, substantive guidance to taxpayers re-
garding how to interpret the I.R.C.
B. Revenue Procedures
The IRS has promulgated and published revenue procedures for al-
most as long as it has issued revenue rulings-since 1955." In the very first
revenue procedure, announcing the revenue procedure program, the IRS
described the format's scope as limited to "statements of practice and pro-
cedure issued primarily for internal use ... which affect rights or duties of
taxpayers or other members of the public" or "which should be a matter of
public knowledge."34 Although a series of successor revenue procedures
have superseded that initial document, the descriptions of the revenue pro-
cedure program contained in these successive documents have not changed
materially. Currently, Treasury and the IRS define a revenue procedure as
"a statement of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or
other members of the public under the Code and related statutes or informa-
29. Rev. Rul. 2008-17, 2008-12 I.R.B. 626.
30. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 872(b)(1)-(2), 883(a)(1)-(3), 883(c) (2006).
31. Rev. Rul. 2008-17, 2008-12 I.R.B. 626.
32. Id.
33. See Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1955-2 C.B. 897; see also Korb, supra note 1, at 336-37
(documenting the history of revenue procedures).
34. Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1955-2 C.B. 897. As with revenue rulings, the numbering for
revenue procedures changed to include the entire year of issuance beginning in 2000. See,
e.g., Rev. Proc. 2000-1, 2000-1 C.B. 4.
35. See Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 (superseding Rev. Proc. 86-15); Rev.
Proc. 86-15, 1986-1 C.B. 544 (superseding Rev. Proc. 78-24); Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B.
503 (superseding Rev. Proc. 72-1); Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693 (superseding Rev.
Proc. 68-44); Rev. Proc. 68-44, 1968-2 C.B. 954 (superseding Rev. Proc. 55-1).
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tion that, although not necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the pub-
lic, should be a matter of public knowledge." 6
From the perspective of many in the tax community, the key element
of these definitional statements is their emphasis on the procedural nature of
revenue procedures, rather than their recognition of a potential impact on
taxpayer rights or obligations." Notwithstanding the official definition,
recent IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb asserted last year that revenue pro-
cedures "do not . .. typically address matters that affect the rights and duties
of taxpayers" and thus "would generally not be useful to taxpayers in plan-
ning transactions or determining positions to be taken on returns."" Korb's
claim echoes the view that one of his predecessors as Chief Counsel, Mit-
chell Rogovin, articulated in 1965.39
Pinning down what it means to affect the rights and duties of taxpay-
ers is a difficult task; but many revenue procedures do seem wholly, or at
least mostly, nonsubstantive. As previously noted, many revenue proce-
dures serve as easily accessible sources for inflation adjustments, interest
rate tables, and other measures mandated by various I.R.C. or Treasury reg-
ulation provisions.40 Other revenue procedures offer instructions for ac-
complishing particular tasks or otherwise communicating with the IRS.4 1
For example, the first revenue procedure issued each year updates instruc-
tions and checklists for taxpayers seeking to file requests for private letter
rulings with the IRS.42
Nevertheless, Korb also admits that the IRS uses revenue procedures
"in keeping the public informed of certain transactions that the Service may
closely scrutinize."43 In making this statement, Korb refers specifically to a
36. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (as amended in 1987); see also Rev. Proc. 89-
14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 (adopting a similar definition); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra
note 4, § 32.2.2.3.2 (same).
37. See, e.g., Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force
on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 730 (2004) (noting that the IRS initially "distin-
guished revenue procedures from revenue rulings, the latter pertaining to 'substantive tax
law,' as opposed to 'internal practices or procedures'); see also supra note 11 and accom-
panying text (describing a common conception of revenue procedures as addressing proce-
dural matters).
38. Korb, supra note 1, at 338; see also Salem et al., supra note 37, at 730 (observ-
ing that "[i]n recent years, however, the IRS seems to have expanded the function of revenue
procedures," and identifying the same line of revenue procedures).
39. See Rogovin, supra note 14, at 764 n.40.
40. See supra note 28 and related text (discussing and providing examples).
41. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-36 I.R.B. 587; Rev. Proc. 2008-35, 2008-29
I.R.B. 132; see also Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. I app. E (listing other revenue proce-
dures providing various checklists and other instructions relevant to taxpayers).
42. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. 1; see also BITTKER ET AL., supra
note 25, 46.05[2][a] (describing the first revenue procedure for each year as prescribing "in
a general way the facts, documents, and data that must be included in requests for rulings").
43. See Korb, supra note 1, at 337.
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series of revenue procedures interpreting Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-4,"
which requires taxpayers to file with the IRS a disclosure statement for any
"reportable transaction" in which the taxpayer participates. 45 The regulation
in turn defines a reportable transaction as any transaction that falls within
one of several categories of varying breadth and detail.46 In other words,
whether or not a taxpayer is required to file a disclosure statement for a par-
ticular transaction depends entirely upon whether that transaction falls with-
in the scope of the reportable transaction definition. Taxpayers who fail to
properly disclose a reportable transaction are subject to congressionally
mandated penalties for their failure.47 The IRS has issued several revenue
procedures identifying specific transactions as falling outside the scope of
that regulatory definition.48 In theory, one might argue that Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.6011-4 is a procedural rule in that it merely imposes a filing re-
quirement, and thus that revenue procedures elaborating that requirement
are likewise procedural. In litigation, however, the government has recog-
nized that Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-4 is substantive, not procedural, at
least as administrative law doctrine understands those terms.49 It would
seem to follow, therefore, that any revenue procedure that elaborates Trea-
sury Regulation § 1.6011-4 by identifying transactions outside its scope is
likewise substantive.
The IRS's utilization of the revenue procedure format to articulate
substantive legal interpretations, however, far exceeds the limited context
that Korb acknowledges.so For example, the IRS routinely uses the revenue
procedure format to establish safe harbors for satisfying various I.R.C. re-
quirements." Revenue Procedure 2008-26 identifies circumstances in
which the IRS will not challenge whether a security is a "readily marketable
security" for certain purposes relevant to controlled foreign corporations.52
Revenue Procedure 2008-16 outlines conditions under which it will recog-
nize a dwelling unit as "property held for productive use in a trade or busi-
44. See id. at 337 n.63.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (as amended in 2007).
46. Id. § 1.6011-4(b).
47. See I.R.C. § 6707A (West 2008).
48. See Rev. Proc. 2007-20, 2007-1 C.B. 517; Rev. Proc. 2004-68, 2004-2 C.B. 969;
Rev. Proc. 2004-67, 2004-2 C.B. 967; Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-2 C.B. 966.
49. Brief for Respondent on APA Section 553(b)(3)(A) at 4, BLAK Invs. v.
Comm'r, No. 1283-07 (T.C. Jan. 19, 2007).
50. The government has admitted as much in litigation. See, e.g., Reply Brief for
the United States in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 19, Fed.
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. United States, No. 00-369T, 2002 WL 34346912, at *11 (Ct. Fed.
Cl. Aug. 23, 2002) (conceding that "a revenue procedure may . . . address the interpretation
of a statute where the interpretation is integral to the prescription of the procedural rule").
51. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-10, 2009-2 I.R.B. 267; Rev. Proc. 2008-43, 2008-30
I.R.B. 186; Rev. Proc. 2008-25, 2008-13 I.R.B. 686.
52. See Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014.
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ness or for investment" purposes under the provisions governing like-kind
exchanges." Revenue Procedure 2002-12 articulates parameters under
which restaurants can deduct rather than capitalize "smallwares" (dishes,
cutlery, and glassware).54
Perhaps revenue procedures that offer safe harbors reflect administra-
bility concerns and resulting enforcement policy choices more than the
IRS's true beliefs as to the meaning of the statute or regulation at issue.
Practically and substantively, however, it is difficult to distinguish these
revenue procedures from revenue rulings interpreting the law as applied to
specified fact patterns. Much of the text of these revenue procedures is ded-
icated to analyzing the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions to explain
the interpretive rationale behind the safe harbor and limiting the scope of
the safe harbor's applicability. Some of these revenue procedures do im-
pose procedural requirements as well, but others do not. Revenue Proce-
dure 2002-12, concerning smallwares, asks taxpayers seeking the safe har-
bor to file a particular IRS form designated for requesting accounting me-
thod changes." Revenue Procedure 2008-26, on the other hand, contains no
similar procedural requirement. By way of comparison, in Revenue Ruling
2007-3, the IRS recognized two situations in which an accrual-basis taxpay-
er incurs liabilities and also declared that taxpayers altering their tax ac-
counting method to comply with the ruling must first satisfy certain proce-
dural requirements.6
C. Notices
Routine IRS utilization of the notice format is a newer development,
the origins of which are less clear. Treasury regulations expressly recogniz-
ing, defining, and governing publication of the revenue ruling and revenue
procedure formats do not mention notices." Unlike with revenue rulings
and revenue procedures, there is no document in which the IRS announced
the notice format. In the Internal Revenue Manual, the IRS defines notices
merely as "public pronouncement[s] by the Service that may contain guid-
ance that involves substantive interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code
or other provisions of the law.""
53. See Rev. Proc. 2008-16, 2008-10 I.R.B. 547.
54. See Rev. Proc. 2002-12, 2002-1 C.B. 374.
55. See id.; see also DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM
3115: APPLICATION FOR CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING METHOD (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f3115.pdf.
56. See Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-4 I.R.B. 350; see also Rev. Rul. 2005-42, 2005-2
C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 2004-62, 2004-1 C.B. 1072.
57. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (as amended in 1987).
58. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 32.2.2.3.3.
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The first notice so-labeled seems to have been published in the IRB in
1976.11 The IRS published just a few notices in the late 1970s, without seri-
al numbering, and for seemingly random purposes: waiving a filing re-
quirement for certain subordinate exempt organizations for the 1975 tax
year because governing regulations had not been finalized,60 or publishing
and updating a list of countries subject to certain international boycott limi-
tations, for example.61 The notice format became more regularized in the
1980s, including more frequent IRS issuance of notices and numbering re-
sembling that of revenue rulings and revenue procedures.62  The subject
matter of notices, however, continues to be somewhat eclectic."
As with revenue rulings and revenue procedures, some notices provide
interest rate or other tables in connection with various provisions of the
I.R.C." Some notices respond to new issues, for example by telling taxpay-
ers how the IRS interprets and intends to enforce recently-enacted substan-
tive tax laws,' or by offering taxpayers extensions, penalty waivers, or oth-
er temporary relief until the IRS can provide further guidance essential for
effective implementation. Still other notices grant other relief to taxpayers
affected by natural disasters67 or other identified crises. 68 In theory, at least,
59. I.R.S. Notice, 1976-1 C.B. 541. This Notice appears unnumbered in the C.B.
60. Id.
61. I.R.S. Notice, 1977-1 C.B. 528 (titled "List of Countries Requiring Cooperation
With an International Boycott"); I.R.S. Notice, 1976-2 C.B. 627 (titled "List of Countries
Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott"). Although these notices appear in the
C.B. with titles, they are not numbered. The IRS updated this list of countries regularly
through 1995 using the notice format. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 95-65, 1995-2 C.B. 342; I.R.S.
Notice 95-41, 1995-2 C.B. 328; I.R.S. Notice 95-20, 1995-1 C.B. 303; I.R.S. Notice 95-3,
1995-1 C.B. 290; I.R.S. Notice 94-95, 1994-2 C.B. 564.
62. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 80-1, 1980-1 C.B. 576.
63. See Korb, supra note 1, at 339-40 (noting that topics of notices "can include
changes to forms or to other previously published materials, solicitation of public comments
on issues under consideration, and advance notice of rules to be provided in regulations when
the regulations may not be published in the immediate future").
64. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-16, 2009-8 I.R.B. 572; I.R.S. Notice 2009-2, 2009-
4 I.R.B. 344; I.R.S. Notice 2008-114, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1322; I.R.S. Notice 2008-85, 2008-42
I.R.B. 905.
65. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-12, 2009-6 I.R.B. 446; I.R.S. Notice 2008-109,
2008-50 I.R.B. 1282; I.R.S. Notice 2008-101, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1082.
66. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B. 516; I.R.S. Notice 2009-11,
2009-5 I.R.B. 420; I.R.S. Notice 2008-90, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1000.
67. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-87, 2008-42 I.R.B. 930; I.R.S. Notice 2008-66,
2008-31 I.R.B. 270; I.R.S. Notice 2008-58, 2008-28 I.R.B. 81; I.R.S. Notice 2008-57, 2008-
28 I.R.B. 80; I.R.S. Notice 2005-73, 2005-2 C.B. 723; see also I.R.C. § 7805A (granting
Treasury and IRS authority and discretion to grant certain relief in response to Presidentially-
declared disasters).
68. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-88, 2008-42 I.R.B. 933; I.R.S. Notice 2008-55,
2008-27 I.R.B. 11.
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notices are less formal than revenue rulings or revenue procedures, and thus
are better suited to provide meaningful substantive guidance quickly. 9
Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant functions for which
the IRS now routinely publishes notices. The first arises particularly in the
context of tax shelters. Whereas the IRS uses the revenue procedure format
to notify taxpayers of transactions that are not reportable under Treasury
Regulation § 1.6011-4,70 the IRS has issued numerous notices declaring
particular transactions to be "listed transactions" that are thus, by regulatory
definition, reportable." Other notices merely identify certain transactions as
potentially abusive, and thus "of interest" and subject to disclosure under
Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-4.72 These notices tend to provide factual
descriptions of the transactions at issue but little legal analysis to explain or
support the designation. Nevertheless, either label represents a substantive
legal conclusion with particular consequences because, again, taxpayers
engaging in such transactions must file disclosure statements with the IRS
or face substantial financial penalties.73
The IRS also frequently uses the notice format as a companion to the
APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking process.74 Many notices announce
that the IRS is contemplating a potential regulation or other guidance
project and solicit preliminary comments." These notices often include
"interim guidance" in the form of preliminary rules that the IRS proposes to
incorporate in the forthcoming proposed rules.76 Sometimes, the IRS expli-
citly proclaims the rules announced in such notices as optional "safe har-
bors" until the rulemaking process converts the safe harbors to require-
69. See, e.g., Korb, supra note 1, at 339 (emphasizing relative informality of notices
and consequent suitability for providing immediate guidance).
70. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing revenue procedures
and reportable transactions).
71. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299; I.R.S. Notice 2008-34,
2008-12 I.R.B. 645; I.R.S. Notice 2007-83, 2007-45 I.R.B. 960. A more complete list of
transactions designated by the IRS as abusive, including listed transactions and delisted
transactions, is available on the IRS website. See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html#17 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
72. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-7, 2009-3 I.R.B. 312; I.R.S. Notice 2008-99, 2008-
47 I.R.B. 1194; I.R.S. Notice 2007-73, 2007-36 I.R.B. 545; I.R.S. Notice 2007-72, 2007-36
I.R.B. 544.
73. See I.R.C. § 6707A (West 2008).
74. See infra Part II.A (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA).
75. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-17, 2009-8 I.R.B. 575; I.R.S. Notice 2008-27,
2008-10 I.R.B. 543; I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282; I.R.S. Notice 2007-8, 2007-3
I.R.B. 276.
76. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-116, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1372; I.R.S. Notice 2009-8,
2009-4 I.R.B. 347; I.R.S. Notice 2006-96, 2006-46 I.R.B. 902.
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ments." Although the IRS does not pursue the APA notice-and-comment
process for IRB guidance, the IRS will sometimes issue notices requesting
public comment on proposed revenue rulings or revenue procedures." The
IRS also has used notices to announce changes in effective dates for final
regulations 9 or to preliminarily attempt to alleviate unanticipated problems
arising from existing regulations pending further action.o
In sum, the IRS's actual use of the three principal IRB guidance for-
mats demonstrates both considerable functional overlap and routine devia-
tion from tax community understandings of what each format represents.
As a result, in considering the administrative law consequences of IRB
guidance according to the doctrines outlined in Part II of this Essay, it
makes little sense categorically to distinguish a legal interpretation ad-
vanced through a revenue ruling from one adopted in a revenue procedure
or notice purely on the basis of labels. Thus, for example, in assessing
whether a pronouncement is merely procedural or advances a substantive
interpretation of law, one should consider carefully what the individual doc-
ument actually does, irrespective of whether the IRS uses the revenue pro-
cedure format.
At the same time, as this Essay discusses further in Part III, the differ-
ent IRB guidance formats share certain attributes in common-e.g., poten-
tial penalties for noncompliance-that are arguably relevant in determining
the administrative law consequences of each. The fact that the IRS utilizes
these formats in ways that functionally overlap suggests that a judicial con-
clusion regarding the administrative law consequences of a revenue ruling
may be significant for judicial review of a revenue procedure or notice, and
vice versa.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF AGENCY RULES
Administrative law doctrine is notoriously murky and complex. A full
exposition of the many administrative law questions that bedevil scholars
and judges alike is beyond the scope of this Essay. Nevertheless, before
proceeding to ponder the administrative law questions raised by IRB guid-
ance, some basic administrative law background may be helpful.
77. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-78, 2008-41 I.R.B. 851; I.R.S. Notice 2008-23,
2008-7 I.R.B. 433; see also I.R.S. Notice 2008-68, 2008-34 I.R.B. 418; I.R.S. Notice 2008-
62, 2008-29 I.R.B. 130.
78. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-80, 2008-40 I.R.B. 820; I.R.S. Notice 2008-63,
2008-31 I.R.B. 261; I.R.S. Notice 2007-59, 2007-30 I.R.B. 135.
79. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-98, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1080; I.R.S. Notice 2008-21,
2008-7 I.R.B. 431; I.R.S. Notice 2008-9, 2008-3 I.R.B. 277.
80. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-13, 2009-6 I.R.B. 447; I.R.S. Notice 2008-43,
2008-15 I.R.B. 748.
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Two potentially overlapping strains of administrative law doctrine are
particularly relevant in evaluating IRS utilization of IRB guidance. The
first involves APA procedural requirements for agency rulemaking. The
second concerns judicial review of agency legal interpretations.
A. Rulemaking and Procedure
Administrative Procedure Act § 553 imposes procedural requirements
on agency rulemaking efforts.8' That statute contemplates legislative rules
as a default category that the promulgating agency must subject to specific
procedures, including but not limited to public notice and opportunity for
comment, before the rules go into effect.82 The same provision provides
several exceptions from those requirements, including exceptions for "inter-
pretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure or practice.""
Legislative rules arise when federal statutes authorize agencies to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement statutory commands or pur-
poses. 84 When agencies exercise such authority in the pursuit of statutory
objectives, they are said to "create law;"" to "prescribe, modify, or abolish
duties, rights, or exemptions;"" or to "fill" statutory "gaps."8 ' The resulting
legislative rules carry the force and effect of law," which is why the APA
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
82. See id. § 553(b)-(d).
83. Id. § 553(b)(A). Section 553 also provides exemptions from its procedural
requirements for rules involving military or foreign affairs and rules "relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," and
"when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Id. § 553(a)(2), (b)(B). These
exceptions are not relevant for the purposes of this Essay.
84. See, e.g., Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2003);
Ass'n for Regulatory Reform v. Pierce, 849 F.2d 649, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Grumman Ohio
Corp. v. Dole, 776 F.2d 338, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d
694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
85. Prof'ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 602 (5th Cir.
1995); Indiana v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cabais v. Egger, 690
F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (quoting Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952)).
86. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (1985); see also, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03
(1978) (describing legislative rules as "affecting individual rights and obligations"); Hemp
Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that legislative rules
"create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress").
87. See Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2000); United Techs. Corp.
v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
88. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 295; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 23, 30 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY
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ordinarily subjects these rules to public notice and comment before they
become final.
Even the most carefully constructed statutory or regulatory scheme,
however, leaves a host of unresolved details involving both procedural ad-
ministration and substantive application of the law to individual facts.
Agencies often publish informal guidance documents containing nonlegisla-
tive rules to address at least some of these issues. Whether characterized as
interpretative rules," procedural rules,"o or policy statements," none of these
nonlegislative rules carries the force and effect of law.92 Rather, interpreta-
tive rules "seek only to interpret language" already existing in statutes or
"properly issued regulations;". "merely clarify or explain existing law or
regulations;"" or "simply state[ ] what the administrative agency thinks the
statute means."95 Procedural rules govern how an agency "organiz[es] [its]
internal operations""6 and "do not themselves alter the rights or interests of
GENERAL'S MANUAL]; see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995
F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the distinction between legislative rules
and interpretative rules or policy statements is that the former carries "the force of law");
Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1045, 1046
(2000) (describing legislative rules as "legally binding"); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking
Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992) (defining legislative regulations as binding both
the government and regulated parties).
89. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); Utah Envtl.
Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 746 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Robert A. Anthony, "Inter-
pretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 1, 12 (1994) (stating that "[b]ecause an interpretive rule has not been set forth legisla-
tively, it is not legally binding").
91. See, e.g., Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).
92. See also Strauss, supra note 88, at 1464 (observing that interpretive formats
falling within the scope of rulemaking for APA purposes "may be binding or not, and may
bind the issuing agency, members of the regulated public, neither, or both").
93. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Chao v. Rothermel,
327 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 95
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding a rule legislative because it "does not purport to construe any lan-
guage in a relevant statute or regulation; it does not interpret anything").
94. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted); Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc., 260 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
95. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 198 F.3d 944, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Shalala v. Guernsey
Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (observing that interpretative rules may be "issued by
an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers"); Sentara-Hampton Gen. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that a rule may be interpretative if it "represents the agency's explanation of a statu-
tory or regulatory provision").
96. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Aulenback,
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parties."9 7 Policy statements set forth "the manner in which [an] agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power,"98 such as "how the agency
plans to exercise its enforcement discretion,"" allowing agencies "to an-
nounce their 'tentative intentions for the future' without binding them-
selves."'" They "[do] not seek to change the normative standards under
which [a] statute operates."'o'
Agencies have an incentive to characterize their rules as non-
legislative to avoid the procedural burdens of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing.10 2 Also, while pronouncements that agencies label as nonlegislative by
definition cannot be legally binding, they nevertheless may enjoy what is
known as practical binding effect, because prudent regulated parties seeking
to avoid confrontation with the government tend to comply with whatever
guidance the agency cares to offer.o3 The lower courts have developed
standards for evaluating whether a rule that an agency labels as nonlegisla-
tive is in fact binding, and thus carries the force of law and is subject to no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.'" Yet, beyond opining gener-
Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass'n
v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
97. JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Inova
Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying same standard and
quoting JEM Broadcasting).
98. Conn. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 9
F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting ATToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 88, at
30 n.3, and citing enforcement criteria as an example); United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d
1279, 1291 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 88, at 30
n.3).
99. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006); see
also Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that en-
forcement discretion is relevant in connection with distinguishing policy statements from
legislative rules).
100. Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1046 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38
(D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Veneman, 469 F.3d at 839 (quoting Bowen for same proposition);
Prof'ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1995).
101. Conn. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 9 F.3d at 984; see also Prof'Is & Pa-
tients for Customized Care, 56 F.3d at 596 ("A general statement of policy, on the other
hand, does not establish a 'binding norm.').
102. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpreta-
tive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 555 (2000).
103. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir.
2000); see also Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not
Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (2001) ("[T]he agency can make [interpretative guid-
ance] practically binding by routinely applying it as a fixed criterion for decisions. Beyond
that, the practical binding effect of an interpretive [sic] guidance is a function of the likelih-
ood that it will be challenged in court, and then of the likelihood that the court will uphold
the guidance.").
104. See, e.g., JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326-28 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussing characteristics distinguishing procedural rules from substantive ones); Am. Mining
Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (articulat-
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ally that legislative rules possess legal force and nonlegislative rules do not,
the Supreme Court has offered little guidance as to what the force of law
means for this purpose.
B. Judicial Review and Deference
Separately from these efforts to classify rules for APA procedural pur-
poses, the courts have addressed the question of what standard of review
they should employ in reviewing agency legal interpretations. In Christen-
sen v. Harris Countyos and United States v. Mead Corp.,"o' the Supreme
Court outlined two possibilities. The first, articulated in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., contains a two-part inquiry
that asks first whether the statute being interpreted clearly and unambi-
guously resolves the issue and, if not, whether the administering agency's
interpretation of the statute is a permissible one.o' The second option
comes from Skidmore v. Swift, which calls upon a reviewing court to decide
for itself the appropriate level of judicial deference for an agency's interpre-
tation of the law by analyzing various factors including, but not limited to,
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."' According
to the Court in Mead, Chevron applies only if Congress has given the agen-
cy in question the authority to bind regulated parties with "the force of law"
and if the agency has in fact "exercised that authority."" If either of these
conditions is lacking, then Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative
standard."o
Just as agencies have an incentive to characterize their rules as nonle-
gislative, they also have good reason to push and pull at the boundaries of
Chevron: to obtain the maximum level of deference for their rules, whether
or not they have satisfied the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing criteria for determining when an agency rule reflects agency intent to exercise congres-
sionally-delegated legislative power, and thus carries the force of law); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.3-6.5 (4th ed. 2004) (summarizing evolution of
standards for distinguishing legislative rules from policy statements, interpretative rules, and
procedural rules).
105. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
106. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
107. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984).
108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Citing Skidmore, the Mead
Court paraphrased these factors in describing the standard as based upon "the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness
of the agency's position." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228.
109. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
110. See id,
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ing. Here too, however, the Court has been reticent to offer guidance. Hav-
ing pronounced the force of law as the touchstone of Chevron deference, the
Court has declined to specify what it means by that concept. In Christen-
sen, the Court made clear that opinion letters as well as "policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines" do not carry the force of law,
but offered no further explanation.'" In Mead, the Court recognized agency
utilization of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication as
evidence of the legal force requisite for Chevron deference.'12 Yet the Court
explicitly declined to limit Mead's force of law requirement to those two
procedural contexts, while offering little further guidance about the con-
cept's parameters."' The Court has maintained this position to date."4
In sum, whether a rule carries the force and effect of law is a question
of great significance for rules that have a claim to being nonlegislative, both
for determining whether the procedural requirements of notice-and-
comment rulemaking apply after all and for deciding whether Chevron or
Skidmore provides the appropriate standard for judicial review. Indeed,
judicial rhetoric regarding both questions is remarkably similar.
But when can a rule be said to possess legal force? Does the same de-
finition apply to resolve both when an agency must use the notice-and-
comment process to promulgate a rule and when Chevron deference applies,
or is the meaning of the force of law context-specific? These questions re-
main unanswered, and are particularly relevant in the context of IRB guid-
ance.
III. ENTERING THE No MAN'S LAND
A reasonably consistent narrative exists concerning administrative law
doctrine and IRB guidance. This common understanding is not entirely
static, but nevertheless reflects comfortable old assumptions that may no
longer be quite accurate. We have already seen, for example, that current
IRS utilization of IRB guidance formats does not necessarily fit either tax
community perceptions or official definitions.
111. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
112. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230 ("Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases
applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication.").
113. See id. at 231 (rejecting procedural formality as a necessary condition for Che-
vron deference).
114. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231) (quoting
Mead for the proposition that "notice-and-comment rulemaking [does] 'not decide the case"'
for or against Chevron deference); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002)
(agreeing that "deference under Chevron does not necessarily require an agency's exercise of
express notice-and-comment rulemaking power").
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Three additional contemporary aspects of IRB guidance further threat-
en the established consensus by placing IRB guidance squarely in the gray
area of the force of law concept. The first involves the imposition of penal-
ties upon taxpayers who decline or otherwise fail to comply with IRB guid-
ance. The second is the current litigating posture of the Department of Jus- -
tice and IRS claiming Chevron deference for IRB guidance. The third in-
volves a provision in the I.R.C. permitting Treasury to predicate retroactive
application of Treasury regulations upon the prior issuance of a notice ad-
dressing the issue, and Treasury's utilization of that authority.
A. The Emerging Consensus
When the IRS first announced the revenue ruling and revenue proce-
dure programs in the 1950s, courts and commentators considered even most
Treasury regulations-specifically, those promulgated under the general
authority grant of I.R.C. § 7805(a) to "prescribe . . . all needful rules and
regulations"--to be interpretative rules lacking legal force."' Given that
understanding, there was simply no doubt that IRB guidance was nonbind-
ing and merely advisory in nature."'
While the legal force of Treasury regulations is no longer seriously
questioned, whether APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements
apply to them remains a matter of some debate."7 Meanwhile, as the proper
115. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative,
and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1948) (characterizing general authority Treasury
regulations as "[a] leading example of interpretative regulations"); Stanley S. Surrey, The
Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U.
PA. L. REv. 556, 557-58 (1940) (adopting similar view); Comment, Denying Retroactive
Effect to Invalidation ofAdministrative Rules, 12 STAN. L. REv. 826, 830 n.25 (1960) ("Trea-
sury regulations, often classified as interpretive, are regarded as merely stating the Treasury's
construction of the statute and not binding on the taxpayer."). This conclusion applied not
only to general authority Treasury regulations but to non-tax general authority regulations as
well. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537, 1564-72 (2006) (comparing tax and non-tax understand-
ings of legislative and interpretative rules through period including the 1950s).
116. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965) (stating that "[t]he
Commissioner's rulings have only such force as Congress chooses to give them, and Con-
gress has not given them the force of law"); Rogovin, supra note 14, at 763-75 & n.40 (de-
scribing the revenue ruling and revenue procedure programs as intended merely to provide
guidance and information in the interest of uniformity, fairness, and efficiency).
117. See, e.g., Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17, 28 (1983) (noting that while general
authority Treasury regulations are "usually deemed to have the force of law, [they] still qual-
ify as 'interpretative' rules of the Secretary of the Treasury, and therefore are exempt from
the requirements of 5 U.S.C. section 553(c)"). For an overview of this debate, see Kristin E.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1727,
1760-63 (2007) (arguing that Treasury's continued reliance on the interpretative rule excep-
tion is misplaced in light of contemporary jurisprudence); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Treasury
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characterization of Treasury regulations for APA purposes remains in dis-
pute, both Treasury regulations and the CB and IRB continue to state, as
they have for decades, that IRB guidance documents "do not have the force
and effect of Treasury Department Regulations.""' Based largely on this
representation, courts and commentators have placed IRB guidance, and
particularly revenue rulings, squarely in the nonlegislative category, and
thus as exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements." 9
The accepted standard for judicial review of IRB guidance is some-
what less clear. Before deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court described a
revenue ruling as merely reflecting "a legal opinion within the agency"l20
and "'of little aid in interpreting a tax statute.""' More recently, but still
pre-Mead, the Court in Davis v. United States stated with respect to a reve-
nue ruling that, although it did not possess "the force and effect of regula-
tions," it was nevertheless entitled to "considerable weight" to the extent
that it represented "the contemporaneous construction of a statute and ...
[had] been in long use."22 In the decade before the Court decided Mead,
Violates the APA?, 117 TAX NOTES 263 (Oct. 15, 2007) (disagreeing with the reasoning set
forth in Coloring Outside the Lines); Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron Isn't the Answer to APA
Question, 117 TAx NOTES 553 (Oct. 29, 2007) (responding to Cummings's article); and
Amy S. Elliott, Panel Explores Noncompliance with Administrative Procedure Act, 121 TAX
NOTES 1114 (Dec. 8, 2008) (describing a District of Columbia Bar Association Taxation
Session panel debating Treasury's noncompliance with the APA).
118. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1987); 2005-2 C.B., introduc-
tion, ii; 1980-1 C.B., introduction, v; 1970-1 C.B., introduction, xii; 2002-1 I.R.B. introduc-
tion, iii; 1984-1 I.R.B. 3; see also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947) (charac-
terizing IRS rulings published in the IRB as lacking "the force and effect of' Treasury regu-
lations); Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995) (quoting Davis v. United States,
495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990)) (same).
119. Redhouse v. Comm'r, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing revenue
rulings as "classic examples of interpretative rules" exempt from APA § 553 procedural
requirements); E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(same); Peter A. Appel, Note, Administrative Procedure and the Internal Revenue Service:
Delimiting the Substantial Understatement Penalty, 98 YALE L.J. 1435, 1436 (1989) (observ-
ing that courts characterize revenue rulings and revenue procedures as interpretative rules not
subject to APA notice and comment requirements); Galler, supra note 10, at 1045 ("Because
they are considered interpretive rules for purposes of the APA, revenue rulings are exempt
from notice and comment issuance procedures and are published without a precedent an-
nouncement.").
120. Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 22 (1974).
121. Id at 22 n.4 (quoting Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938)).
122. Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990). In a few cases after Davis, the
Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the tax-specific judicial deference standard articulated
in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. Comm'r, 440 U.S. 472, 475-77 (1979) might apply to
revenue rulings. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219
(2001) (citing National Muffler among other precedents generally supporting deference for
reasonable IRS interpretations, in cases involving revenue rulings); Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 n.7 (1991) (suggesting National Muffler as the appropriate defe-
rence standard for revenue rulings). The continued applicability of National Muffler to gen-
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the attitude of the lower courts toward IRB guidance ranged from no defe-
rence at all,123 to intermediate deference,124 to the strongly deferential Che-
vron standard.' Since the Court's decision in Mead, most courts and
commentators have assumed or concluded that Skidmore provides the ap-
propriate evaluative standard for revenue rulings and, to a lesser extent,
other IRB guidance as well,126 although not everyone agrees.127
In sum, whatever disagreements exist at the margins, there seems to be
broad agreement within the tax community that revenue rulings, revenue
procedures, and notices are nonlegislative rules exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements and are eligible at most for some lesser
degree of judicial deference than Chevron review. This position is consis-
tent with traditional understandings that IRB guidance is nonbinding and
does not enjoy the same legal weight as Treasury regulations. The question,
therefore, is whether the traditional understandings hold and, thus, whether
the consensus view is sustainable.
eral authority Treasury regulations is a subject of much controversy, but is outside the scope
of this Essay.
123. The Tax Court in particular has long characterized revenue rulings as mere IRS
litigating positions meriting only the respect due to any party's well-reasoned argument. See,
e.g., McLaulin v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 255, 263 (2000); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.
13, 45-46 (1995). The Tax Court has made similar statements with respect to revenue proce-
dures and notices. See, e.g., Philips Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 78, 99 n.17 (1993)
(comparing notices to revenue rulings and revenue procedures and denying them "special
deference").
124. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.
1998) (extending "some weight" or "respectful consideration" to revenue rulings, but recog-
nizing range of deference accorded by other lower courts).
125. See, e.g., Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 977 (6th Cir.
1993); CenTra Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (6th Cir. 1992).
126. See, e.g., Kornman & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 452-57 (5th
Cir. 2008) (concluding after full consideration that Skidmore rather than Chevron deference
applies to revenue rulings); Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that Mead requires Skidmore rather than Chevron deference for revenue
rulings); PBS Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 129 T.C. 131, 144-45 (2007) (identifying Skidmore
as the appropriate evaluative standard for revenue rulings); BITrKER ET AL., supra note 25, at
46.05[4] & n.174 (recognizing post-Mead that some courts have applied Skidmore defe-
rence to revenue rulings); Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 2081,
2123 (2005) (recognizing that "a consensus is emerging that revenue rulings are entitled to
Skidmore deference"); Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 720 (recommending that the courts apply Mead to
"give revenue rulings, certain revenue procedures, and notices, deference under the doctrine
of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.").
127. See, e.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. Comm'r, 522 F.3d 937, 945-
47 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J. concurring) (contending Chevron deference is appropriate
for Rev. Proc. 2002-40); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial
Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REv. 1, 43-44 (2006) (advocating
deference as described in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. Comm'r, 440 U.S. 472, 475-77
(1979), for IRB guidance).
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B. Contrary Litigating Positions
In litigating tax cases, the government faces the same questions con-
cerning the legal force of and deference due to IRB guidance, although
more often respecting the latter. Department of Justice and IRS attorneys
regularly express their views in tax cases regarding the appropriate standard
for judicial review of IRB guidance. By contrast, I know of no contempo-
rary cases in which taxpayers have challenged the validity of IRB guidance
for failing to satisfy APA procedural requirements for legislative rules. In
at least two ongoing cases, however, the government is defending Treasury
regulations against such claims with arguments that one can only expect it
would assert with respect to IRB guidance as well. The government's liti-
gating positions on both the judicial deference and APA compliance ques-
tions do not quite comport with the emerging consensus regarding the ad-
ministrative law of IRB guidance described in Part III.A above. Indeed, the
government's arguments regarding judicial deference for IRB guidance are
arguably inconsistent with those concerning APA rulemaking requirements.
Regarding the judicial deference question, the government consistent-
ly takes the litigating position that IRB guidance is entitled to Chevron defe-
rence. The government arguably sought Chevron deference for IRB guid-
ance for some time before Christensen and Mead, although its arguments in
those days tended to be vague calls for deference accompanied by cites to
several cases including but not limited to Chevron.'28 Since the Supreme
Court decided Christensen and Mead, however, the government's argu-
ments have become significantly more explicit, asserting outright that IRB
guidance carries the force of law.
As noted above, to establish Chevron eligibility, Mead requires that
Congress delegate to an agency the power to bind regulated parties with the
force of law and that the agency exercise that authority in adopting the legal
interpretation at issue.'29 In tax cases involving IRB guidance, therefore, the
government asserts that the I.R.C. gives Treasury and the IRS as its delegate
the power to bind regulated parties with the force of law. The government
claims this status for both specific grants of rulemaking power contained in
substantive provisions of the I.R.C.'30 and the general authority to adopt "all
128. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 11-12, Kiourtsis v. Comm'r, No. 97-4016 (2d
Cir. Aug. 18, 1997), 1997 WL 33616668, at *11-12; Brief for the Appellant-Cross-Appellee
at 22-23, Intel Corp. v. Comm'r, Nos. 94-70105 & 94-70158 (9th Cir. Dec. 1994), 1994 WL
1650843 1, at *22-23 (same).
129. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
130. See, e.g., Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 56, General Mills, Inc. v. United
States, No. 08-1638 (8th Cir. June 12, 2008), 2008 WL 2505866, at *58 (identifying specific
authority under I.R.C. § 404(k)(5) for Rev. Rul. 2001-6); Brief for the Appellee at 58, Con-
opco, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-3564 (3d Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843, at *58
(making same argument regarding Rev. Rul. 2001-6); Brief for the Appellee at 23, Lehrer v.
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needful rules and regulations" extended by I.R.C. § 7805(a).'"' The gov-
ernment also observes that IRB guidance documents are "official" agency
pronouncements, reviewed and issued by top agency officials and published
in the IRB, just like regulations. 3 2 Revenue rulings are "formal interpreta-
tive rulings involving 'substantive tax law"l 33 and have precedential effect
for the disposition of other cases.'34 Revenue procedures at least "pre-
Comm'r, No. 06-75584 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 1577418, at *12 (identifying
specific rulemaking authority under I.R.C. § 475(f) for Rev. Proc. 99-17).
131. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 59-60, Conopco, Inc. v. United States, No.
07-3564 (3d Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843, at *59-60 (identifying I.R.C. § 7805(a)
general authority as also supporting Rev. Rul. 2001-6); Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at
39, U.S.A. Choice Internet Serv., L.L.C. v. United States, No. 2007-5077 (Fed. Cir. June 13,
2007), 2007 WL 1997157, at *20 (relying solely on I.R.C. § 7805(a) general rulemaking
authority in claiming Chevron deference revenue rulings); Brief for the Defendant-Appellant
at 27-28, Texaco Inc. v. United States, No. 06-16098 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2006), 2006 WL
3623262, at * 13 (same); Brief for the Respondent-Appellant at 31, Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v.
Comm'r, No. 01-2741 (6th Cir. May 20, 2002), 2002 WL 34200821, at *17 (same); see also
Reply Brief for the Appellant, the United States at 25, Fed. Nat'1 Mortgage Ass'n v. United
States, No. 03-5162 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2004), 2004 WL 3763424, at *25 (claiming I.R.C. §
7805(a) as supporting Rev. Proc. 99-43).
132. Brief for the Appellee at 60, Conopco, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-3564 (3d
Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843, at *60; Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 42-43, For-
tis, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-2518 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 5280992, at *21-22;
Reply Brief for the Appellant, the United States at 25, Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. United
States, No. 03-5162 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2004), 2004 WL 3763424, at *25; Brief for the Res-
pondent-Appellant at 31, Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, No. 01-2741 (6th Cir. May 20,
2002), 2002 WL 34200821, at * 17; see also Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 28, Texaco
Inc. v. United States, No. 06-16098 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2006), 2006 WL 3623262, at *13
(acknowledging that, like Treasury regulations, revenue rulings are "published," in addition
to being "written and reviewed at the same level of the IRS and the Department of Trea-
sury").
133. Brief for the Appellant at 58, General Mills, Inc. v. United States, No. 08-1638
(8th Cir. June 12, 2008), 2008 WL 2505866, at *58; Brief for the Appellee at 60, Conopco,
Inc. v. United States, No. 07-3564 (3d Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843, at *60; Brief
for the Appellant, the United States at 39-40, U.S.A. Choice Internet Serv., L.L.C. v. United
States, No. 2007-5077 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2007), 2007 WL 1997157, at *20; Brief for Defen-
dant-Appellant at 42-43, Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-2518 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2005),
2005 WL 5280992, at *22.
134. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant at 58, General Mills, Inc. v. United States, No.
08-1638 (8th Cir. June 12, 2008), 2008 WL 2505866, at *58; Brief for the Appellee at 60,
Conopco, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-3564 (3d Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843, at
*60; Brief for the Appellant, the United States at 39-40, U.S.A. Choice Internet Serv., L.L.C.
v. United States, No. 2007-5077 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2007), 2007 WL 1997157, at *20; Brief
for the Appellant at 27 n.10, 28, Texaco Inc. v. United States, No. 06-16098 (9th Cir. Sept.
29, 2006), 2006 WL 3623262, at *13 & n.10; Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 42-43, Fortis,
Inc. v. United States, No. 05-2518 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 5280992, at *21-22.
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scribe[] necessary rules for the application of the statute,"135 if the govern-
ment does not acknowledge their substantive character outright.'
The government acknowledges that IRB guidance documents do not
satisfy the procedural requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking.'3
In one case, the government claimed that "the only material distinction"
between Treasury regulations and revenue rulings "is that the latter are not
issued pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures."' Yet, as noted above,
the government also correctly observes that the Court has expressly de-
clined to require such procedures for Chevron deference. For all of these
reasons, according to the government, IRB guidance carries the force of
law, and thus satisfies Mead's requirements and qualifies for Chevron defe-
rence.13
Meanwhile, the government has not said very much about APA pro-
cedural requirements and IRB guidance beyond acknowledging that it does
not utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking. Yet, while the government
claims the force of law for the supposedly lesser IRB guidance for purposes
of Mead, the IRS continues to maintain that most Treasury regulations are
exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking as interpretative rules. In
two ongoing cases regarding the procedural validity of Treasury regulations,
the government makes just that argument.140
135. Brief for the Appellee at 26, Lehrer v. Comm'r, No. 06-75584 (9th Cir. Apr. 23,
2007), 2007 WL 1577418, at *12.
136. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellant, the United States at 25, Fed. Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. United States, No. 03-5162 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2004), 2004 WL 3763424,
at *25 (contending that Rev. Proc. 99-43 "contains not just procedural instructions, but rather
a substantive rule regarding when a taxpayer meets the requirements for application of the
special rule").
137. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 23, Lehrer v. Comm'r, No. 06-75584 (9th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 1577418, at *12; Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 42-43, Fortis,
Inc. v. United States, No. 05-2518 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 5280992, at *22; Brief
for the Appellant at 31, Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, No. 01-2741 (6th Cir. May 20,
2002), 2002 WL 34200821, at *17.
138. Brief for the Appellant at 28, Texaco Inc. v. United States, No. 06-16098 (9th
Cir. Sept. 29, 2006), 2006 WL 3623262, at *13.
139. Although this argument is implicit in all of the government's claims that, under
Mead, IRB guidance deserves Chevron deference, most of the government's briefs are expli-
cit in stating that IRB guidance carries the force of law. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at
58, Conopco, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-3564 (3d Cir. May 7, 2008), 2008 WL 4126843,
at *60 ("Revenue rulings consequently have the 'force of law' within the meaning of Mead,
and Chevron deference is therefore required."); Brief for the Appellee at 26, Lehrer v.
Comm'r, No. 07-3564 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 1577418, at *12 (claiming that Rev.
Proc. 99-17 "has the force and effect of law"); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 43, Fortis,
Inc. v. United States, No. 05-2518 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 5280992, at *22 (ar-
guing that, "[1]ike regulations, revenue rulings have legal force and effect" and "[r]evenue
rulings consequently have the 'force of law' within the meaning of Mead").
140. See Brief for the Appellee at 64-66, CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United
States, No. 2009-5025 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 1307200, at *28-29; Respon-
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In BLAK Investments v. Commissioner, in contending that Treasury
regulations are interpretative rules exempt from notice-and-comment rule-
making, the government does not claim outright that these regulations do
not carry the force of law; the government never uses that phrase at all.
Instead, drawing from other judicial rhetoric on the legislative versus inter-
pretative rule distinction, the government notes that the regulations were
issued under I.R.C. § 7805(a) general authority rather than a specific
"'blank slate' grant of authority ... to create the substantive law necessary
to achieve" a particular end result.'4 ' Further, the government suggests that
the regulations do not create new law but merely "provide discretionary
fine-tuning" to existing reporting requirements.'4 2 Similarly, in CNG
Transmission Management VEBA v. United States, the government claims
that the Treasury regulation at issue merely "clarified and explained the
language of' the statute.'43 Here, at least, the government seems to ac-
knowledge that even Treasury regulations issued under the general authority
of I.R.C. § 7805(a) are "'usually deemed to have the force of law."'" Nev-
ertheless, relying on a single Tax Court precedent that predates both Che-
vron and other significant evolutionary changes in administrative law doc-
trine, and without further analysis, the government contends that such Trea-
sury regulations are exempt from APA notice and comment requirements as
interpretative rules.'45 It seems reasonable to anticipate that the government
would make similar arguments in defending against a procedural challenge
to the validity of IRB guidance.
If the force of law is truly the critical dividing line between both Che-
vron and Skidmore on the one hand and legislative and interpretative rules
on the other, and if we accept that the force of law concept has only one
meaning, then the government's litigating positions seem wholly inconsis-
tent. Yet, as noted, the Supreme Court does not currently require such con-
sistency. Hence, the government has merely positioned IRB guidance pre-
cisely in the gray area that the Supreme Court has left regarding the force
dent's Statement Under Rule 50(c) With Respect to Respondent's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment and Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 20-24,
BLAK Invs. v. Comm'r, No. 1283-07 (T.C. May 14, 2008).
141. Respondent's Statement Under Rule 50(c) With Respect to Respondent's Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment and Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 21, BLAK Invs. v. Comm'r, No. 1283-07 (T.C. May 14, 2008) (contrasting
Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996)).
142. Id. at 20, 23-24 (quoting Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879, 886
(9th Cir. 1992)).
143. Brief for the Appellee at 64-66, CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United
States, No. 2009-5025 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 1307200, at *29.
144. Id. at 66 (quoting Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17, 28 (1983)).
145. Id. (relying on Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17, 27-28 & n.1 1(1983)).
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and effect of law, both with respect to Mead and the line between legislative
and interpretative rules.
C. Penalties
Another potential complication for the emerging consensus on the
administrative law of IRB guidance comes from the I.R.C.'s penalty provi-
sions. Specifically, I.R.C. § 6662 imposes a 20% penalty for any "under-
payment of tax required to be shown on a return" that is attributable to,
among other things, "[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations." 46
"Rules or regulations" for this purpose includes not only I.R.C. provisions
and Treasury regulations but also "revenue rulings or notices (other than
notices of proposed rulemaking) issued by the Internal Revenue Service and
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin."' Revenue procedures "may or
may not be treated as 'rules or regulations' depending on all facts and cir-
cumstances.""' In other words, taxpayers are potentially subject to the un-
derpayment penalty, and tax professionals may face the tax preparer penal-
ty, should they decline or otherwise fail to comply with legal interpretations
that the IRS articulates in revenue rulings, notices, and some revenue proce-
dures. Legislative history plainly supports this interpretation,'49 although
the meaning of similar language was much less clear in the 1950s when the
IRS initiated the revenue ruling and revenue procedures.'
146. I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b)(1) (2000).
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (as amended in 1991); T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374,
376 (adopting regulatory definition).
148. T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374, 376 (discussing revenue procedures in the regulato-
ry preamble).
149. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress adopted a new penalty for tax return
preparers guilty of "negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regulations," Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 1203, 90 Stat. 1520, 1689 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2000)) and indi-
cated that "rules and regulations" included "Treasury regulations and IRS rulings," and de-
clared that the new penalty should be interpreted consistently with the provision concerning
negligence and intentional disregard by taxpayers. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 278 (1975), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3174; S REP. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 355-56 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3784-85; H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, at 484 (1976) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4117, 4188.
150. Penalties for negligence and for disregarding rules and regulations have been
part of the tax laws since 1918 and 1921, respectively. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L.
No. 254, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083 (1919) (adopting negligence penalty); Revenue Act of
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 227, 264-65 (1921) (adding intentional disregard
language). The legislative history of these provisions failed to explain Congress's intent, and
for decades their meaning was unclear, and they were not applied if taxpayers could articu-
late a reasonable argument for the inapplicability or invalidity of a rule or regulation. See,
e.g., Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA
L. REv. 637, 659 (1976); Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties - "They Shoot Dogs, Don't
They?", 43 FLA. L. REv. 811, 836-43 (1991); Arnold Hoffman, Intentional Disregard of
Rules and Regulations, 28 TAxES 111, 111-13 (1950).
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Yet, the current standards for assessing penalties for negligence or dis-
regard differ depending upon whether the taxpayer fails to comply with a
Treasury regulation or IRB guidance. Taxpayers who adopt return positions
inconsistent with Treasury regulations must both disclose their noncom-
pliance on their tax returns and have a "reasonable basis" for the position
taken to avoid the 20% underpayment penalty entirely."' Furthermore, a
taxpayer's decision not to comply with a Treasury regulation must represent
"a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation."'52 By comparison,
a taxpayer who declines or otherwise fails to follow mere IRB guidance is
exempt from the 20% penalty if the taxpayer's position "has a realistic pos-
sibility of being sustained on its merits," whether or not the taxpayer dis-
closes the noncompliance or intends to challenge the rule's validity."'
At least at one time, the tax bar understood the reasonable basis stan-
dard as requiring only a colorable claim.'54 Treasury regulations adopted in
1991 described reasonable basis as "arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail
in court.""' By contrast, Treasury historically has defined the realistic pos-
sibility standard as requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate "a one in three, or
greater, likelihood" of success.""' Consequently, some commentators have
151. Disclosure is not required to avoid a penalty for negligence alone, as "[a] return
position that has a reasonable basis . . . is not attributable to negligence." Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1991). Yet reasonable basis alone is inadequate to avoid a
penalty for "intentional disregard," as the regulations define that phrase. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3(b)(2) (explaining the parameters of the intentional disregard language); BITTKER ET
AL., supra note 25, at 150.05[2].
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a), (b)(2). This standard does not apply to taxpayers who
take positions contrary to IRB guidance with respect to a reportable transaction. See id; see
also supra notes 43-49 & 70-73 (discussing the role of certain revenue procedures and notic-
es in identifying reportable transactions).
154. See, e.g., K.H. Sharp, A Smile, a Frown, and a Few New Wrinkles: The Chang-
ing Face of Practice Before the IRS, 70 N.D. L. REv. 965, 967 (1994); Gwen Thayer Han-
delman, Law and Order Comes to "Dodge City": Treasury's New Return Preparer and IRS
Practice Standards, 50 WASH & LEE L. REv. 631, 633 (1993) (reprinted in 60 TAx NOTES
1623, 1625 (1993)); see also Paul M. Predmore, New Reasonable Basis Standard for Return
Disclosure Likely to be Troublesome, 80 J. TAX'N 22, 23 (1994) (suggesting that "'merely a
colorable claim' describes the "not-frivolous" standard and that Congress intended reasona-
ble basis to be "'significantly higher"' than that, but recognizing that the initial Treasury
definition of reasonable basis was only slightly different from not frivolous).
155. T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374, 384 (adopting former Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)).
156. See T.D. 8382, 1992-1 C.B. 392, 394 (adopting former Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(b)(2), containing one in three definition of realistic possibility); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a)
(as amended in 1991) (referring taxpayers to Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2) for description of
realistic possibility); see also BITrKER ET AL., supra note 25, at 1 50.05[2] (recognizing the
one in three definition of realistic possibility); Sharp, supra note 154, at 967 & n.25 (1994)
(same). Recent regulatory amendments have rendered the realistic possibility standard's
definition somewhat ambiguous. In response to 2007 legislation amending I.R.C. § 6694,
Treasury eliminated the definition of the realistic possibility standard previously contained in
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suggested that the realistic possibility standard applicable to noncompliance
with IRB guidance seems actually more onerous than the reasonable basis
standard applicable to Treasury regulations, with reasonable basis
representing a 10-20% chance of success relative to the 33% threshold for
realistic possibility.17
Yet it is clear that Treasury has at least tried to close any perceived
gap between the two standards. Current regulations, adopted in 1998, de-
fine the reasonable basis standard as "a relatively high standard of tax re-
porting," "higher than not frivolous or not patently improper," and "not sa-
tisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or that is merely a color-
able claim."' Even more specifically, the definition expresses the expecta-
tion that, to satisfy the reasonable basis standard, a return position must be
"reasonably based on one or more" of several interpretive documents listed
elsewhere as "substantial authority," including the I.R.C., legislative histo-
ry, Treasury regulations, and published IRS guidance.'" Treasury requires a
similar analysis to satisfy the realistic possibility standard.' Treasury ex-
pressly declined taxpayer requests to rate reasonable basis relative to other
standards such as realistic possibility, to avoid diluting the focus of reason-
able basis.'"' Meanwhile, in defending its use of the realistic possibility for
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) without explaining the impact of that change to the cross-reference
to Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a). See T.D. 9436, 2009-3
I.R.B. 268 (discussing changes in the regulatory preamble). Congress did not change I.R.C.
§ 6662 when it amended I.R.C. § 6694, and Treasury has not signaled any intention to re-
place the realistic possibility standard in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3. Accordingly, the one in
three definition of realistic possibility presumably still applies for purposes of Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3(a) and (b)(2). Nevertheless, the disjunction between the cross-reference in Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) and the amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) simply renders unclear
the appropriate standard for evaluating a taxpayer's decision not to comply with IRB guid-
ance for purposes of the 20% underpayment penalty.
157. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper
Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAx J. 1, 5-6 (2008); Dennis J.
Ventry Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 431, 470 (2008); see also Pred-
more, supra note 154, at 23 (ranking the realistic possibility standard as more onerous than
the reasonable basis standard); Sharp, supra note 154, at 990 (same).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
159. Id. (referring taxpayers to Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) for substantial au-
thority); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1991) (listing types of
authority on which taxpayers may rely as substantial authority).
160. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) (referring taxpayers to Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(b)(2) for definition of realistic possibility standard; T.D. 8382, 1992-1 C.B. 392 (adopting
the old Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) defining the realistic possibility standard and incorporating
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) and (iii) within that definition). But see supra note 156
(discussing the ambiguity created when Treasury recently amended Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2
and eliminated that definition).
161. See T.D. 8790, 1998-2 C.B. 723.
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IRB guidance, Treasury has expressed the view that use of that standard is
"taxpayer-favorable." 62
Given, too, the lack of a disclosure requirement or the need to express-
ly challenge the validity of IRB guidance, it seems likely that Treasury and
the IRS at least intend for the threshold for avoiding the 20% underpayment
penalty to be lower for IRB guidance than for Treasury regulations. As a
practical matter, a taxpayer who flags his noncompliance with a Treasury
regulation on his return and directly challenges the regulation's validity may
as well paint a bulls-eye on his forehead; given the high level of deference
that courts typically give to Treasury regulations under either Chevron or
National Muffler, a taxpayer who declines to follow a Treasury regulation,
fails to adequately disclose his noncompliance, and gets audited is highly
likely to be penalized. By contrast, given low audit rates and the lack of a
disclosure requirement, it is unlikely that a taxpayer who fails to follow a
legal interpretation advanced in IRB guidance will actually be penalized for
that failure.
Nevertheless, as a purely legal matter, taxpayers may be assessed pe-
nalties if they decline to comply with IRB guidance with which they disag-
ree and the IRS or the courts decide that their arguments do not satisfy the
realistic possibility threshold. The question, then, is whether this legal pos-
sibility is sufficient to claim that IRB guidance carries the force and effect
of law-and thus whether IRB guidance that adopts substantive legal inter-
pretations must comply with APA rulemaking requirements and is entitled
to Chevron rather than Skidmore deference.'
Administrative law scholars have debated the extent of the link be-
tween Mead's force of law premise and congressional imposition of penal-
ties for noncompliance with agency legal interpretations.' Further, Tho-
mas Merrill and Kathryn Watts document in their exhaustive examination of
twentieth century regulatory legislation that "knowledgeable participants in
the legislative process understood the presence or absence of a provision
establishing a sanction for rule violations as the key variable differentiating
162. T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374, 376.
163. Accord Peter A. Appel, Note, Administrative Procedure and the Internal Reve-
nue Service: Delimiting the Substantial Understatement Penalty, 98 YALE L.J. 1435, 1436
(1989) (recognizing a potential clash between IRS application of penalties to IRB guidance
and administrative law requirements).
164. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REv. 201, 217 & n.62 (2001); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2027, 2139-40 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 881 (2001); see also William T. Mayton, A
Concept ofa Rule and the "Substantial Impact" Test in Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L.J. 889, 905
(1984) (defining "'force of law' as "whether a rule is an authoritative implementation of the
statute under which an agency acts, authoritative in the sense that in an enforcement action
an agency need prove only that the defendant's conduct was contrary to the rule").
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legislative rulemaking grants from housekeeping ones.""' Yet these discus-
sions all seem to assume that all penalties (or at least all civil penalties) are
equal, and lack a more nuanced discussion of whether different standards
for assessing penalties might influence the question. Does the lesser stan-
dard for evaluating the applicability of penalties for noncompliance mean
that Skidmore rather than Chevron should apply in considering the legal
interpretations adopted in IRB guidance? Does it make a difference wheth-
er that lesser standard renders enforcement comparatively unlikely; and, if
so, then is there some point at which one might conclude that the relative
lack of enforcement potential suggests ignoring the penalty potential in eva-
luating whether an interpretation carries the force of law? These unans-
wered questions-highly relevant in evaluating the administrative law of
IRB guidance-lie at the heart of that gray area of the force of law concept,
where the jurisprudence potentially intersects regarding Mead, Chevron,
and Skidmore on the one hand and the legislative versus interpretative rule
distinction on the other.
D. Notices and Retroactivity
Finally, I.R.C. § 7805(b) raises an interesting potential question for the
force of law concept as applied to certain notices. That provision generally
precludes retroactive application of Treasury regulations' 6 and offers sever-
al exceptions.' 7 In articulating the initial prohibition, however, Congress
explicitly authorized Treasury to make its regulations applicable as of "[t]he
date on which any notice substantially describing the expected contents of
any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public."' 8
Of course, Congress may authorize retroactive regulations, subject on-
ly to a few, easily surmountable constitutional constraints.' 9 Correspon-
dingly, Treasury may exercise the authority granted by I.R.C. § 7805(b),
165. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 503 (2002). Merrill and Watts sug-
gest that tax represents a departure from this understanding, but they fail to take into account
the imposition of the negligence and intentional disregard penalties in the Revenue Acts of
1918 and 1921, respectively. See also supra note 150 (summarizing history of these penal-
ties).
166. See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2000).
167. See id. § 7805(b)(2)-(8).
168. Id. § 7805(b)(1)(C) (granting authority to Secretary of Treasury); Treas. Reg. §
301.7805-1(b) (1967) (delegating authority from the Secretary to the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue).
169. See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking,
1991 DuKE L.J. 106, 114; Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2006).
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limited primarily by a judicial finding of abuse of discretion.o Yet, the
power to make regulations retroactively effective does not automatically
overwrite APA procedural requirements for adopting the regulations in the
first instance, nor does it bear any obvious relationship to the standard of
judicial deference applicable to the regulations.
Assume, for a moment, that none of the arguments acknowledged
above result in IRB guidance generally carrying the force of law, and con-
sider the following hypothetical scenario: A notice articulates a particular
interpretation of the law. Treasury later exercises its authority under I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) to make a final regulation containing the same interpretation ef-
fective retroactively to the date the IRS published the notice. Finally, the
government in an enforcement action seeks to penalize a taxpayer for failing
to comply with the interpretation advanced in the notice.
In fact, this scenario is not a hypothetical one. As noted in Part I
above, the IRS frequently publishes notices with interim guidance, seeking
comments before proceeding with the more formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, and instructing taxpayers that they may rely on the
rules advanced in the notice pending final regulations. Treasury occasional-
ly makes its regulations retroactively effective to the date the IRS published
such a notice, consistent with Treasury's authority under I.R.C. § 7805(b).
Pursuing the Mead line of inquiry, one might reasonably argue that, in
adopting I.R.C. § 7805(b) and authorizing Treasury to make regulations
effective as of the date of notice publication, Congress signaled its intent
that at least some notices bind taxpayers with the same force as the regula-
tions themselves. Legislative history of I.R.C. § 7805(b) suggests that Con-
gress chose to limit the retroactive application of Treasury regulations to
protect taxpayers from penalties for noncompliance with rules they could
not have anticipated."' In permitting retroactive effect where the IRS pre-
170. Courts have used the abuse of discretion standard in evaluating Treasury's deci-
sions to apply its regulations retroactively both before and since 1996 amendments to I.R.C.
§ 7805(b). See, e.g., Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1996); Kla-
math Strategic Inv. Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608, 625 (E.D. Tex.
2006); see also BORIS 1. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAxATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 110.4.3 (2d ed.) (discussing abuse of discretion standard as applied to
decisions to apply Treasury regulations retroactively, including after 1996 amendments).
171. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 104th CONG., OVERSIGHT
INITIATIVE REPORT ON NEED FOR TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, 2 LEGISLATION AND REFORM OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 15 (Comm. Print 1995) (reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 1386-87) ("If the taxpayer interprets the law in a way which is different
from the position taken in a subsequent regulation, the taxpayer may be subject to additional
taxes, penalties, and interest. The Subcommittee believes taxpayers should have more pro-
tections from the retroactive application of tax regulations."); see also Christopher M. Pie-
truszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated
Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 531, 560-62 (2005) (documenting history of
changes to I.R.C. § 7805(b)).
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cedes regulations with a sufficiently detailed notice, Congress presumably
was unconcerned about taxpayers feeling bound under such circumstances.
Similarly, one could contend that, when the IRS publishes a notice with
interim guidance and states its intention to incorporate that guidance in
forthcoming regulations, the IRS exercises that congressionally delegated
power. For purposes of assessing whether APA procedural requirements
apply, at a minimum, one can easily conceive of the argument that such a
notice would have practical binding effect.
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that the perception and reality of IRB guidance are
very different. The potential consequences of that difference are quite sig-
nificant and, frankly, a bit disturbing.
The tax system needs informal guidance. It is simply not practical for
Treasury and the IRS to put all of their interpretations of the I.R.C. into
Treasury regulations. Both the IRS and the tax community rely heavily on
IRB guidance to understand the IRS's thinking on innumerable tax issues.
Yet, it turns out that IRB guidance may not be quite so informal after
all. Congressional actions, government litigating positions, and the IRS's
own utilization all raise a serious question concerning the administrative
law of IRB guidance: does IRB guidance carry the force of law?
Further, in raising this question, IRB guidance requires administrative
law to confront questions thus far left unanswered: what does the force of
law mean, and does it mean the same thing for purposes of APA rulemaking
requirements and judicial deference?
The tax system relies heavily on IRB guidance to direct taxpayer be-
havior. If IRB guidance leads to penalties for noncompliance, retroactively-
applicable rules, and Chevron deference, then taxpayers and courts may be
justifiably concerned by the lack of systematic public input in the promulga-
tion of such pronouncements. Yet, if the lack of procedure attending to IRB
guidance means that these interpretations cannot bind taxpayers' actions
with the force of law, then the IRS loses an important tax enforcement tool.
These are important questions, with real consequences, for the tax commu-
nity and beyond. They are worth taking seriously.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
In Section III.B of the foregoing essay, I stated that I knew of "no con-
temporary cases in which taxpayers have challenged the validity of IRB
guidance for failing to satisfy APA procedural requirements for legislative
rules." On August 7, 2009, after the foregoing essay was complete and had
been formatted for publication, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an
opinion in Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), in which a
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divided panel reversed the district court's dismissal of just such a challenge
against Notice 2006-50, 2006-25 I.R.B. 1141.172 The merits of whether the
IRS should have satisfied APA notice and comment requirements in adopt-
ing Notice 2006-50 were not before the Cohen court, and the court accor-
dingly did not opine on that issue. Accordingly, the Cohen opinion does not
alter any of the analysis in the foregoing essay. Should the panel's decision
remain intact, however, the taxpayers' APA challenge against Notice 2006-
50 will proceed in district court. The government has petitioned for rehear-
ing en banc of the Cohen decision.
172. Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also In re Long-
Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 539 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2008);
Sloan Second Am. Compl. at i1 89-94, In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Re-
fund Litig., 539 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2008), 2006 WL 2444139.
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